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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2A-3(2)Q)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the district court erred in concluding as a matter of law that the

written lease, which had been executed by Nielsen as lessor, was not enforceable
against him.
The standard of review for this legal conclusion is a correction of error
standard. Savage v. Educators Ins. Co., 908 P.2d 862 (Utah 1995). This issue was
preserved for appeal in the trial court at Record, pp. 197, 220-225.
2.

Whether the district court erred in holding that the parties' continuing

performance in accordance with the terms of the written lease did not estop Nielsen,
the lessor, from thereafter claiming that the lease was null and void.
The standard of review as to this legal conclusion is a correction of error
standard. Savage, supra. This issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court at
Record, pp. 197,226-228.
3.

Whether the district court erred in determining that a month-to-month

tenancy existed where the rent stated in the written lease was an annual figure payable
in monthly installments.
The standard of review as to this legal conclusion is a correction of error
standard. Savage, supra. This issue was preserved for appeal in the trial court at
Record, pp. 196-197, 226-227.

4.

Whether the district court erred in ordering a summary remedy where

factual disputes existed.
The standard of review as to the trial court's denial of the Motion for Relief
from Judgment is an abuse of discretion standard. Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). This issue was preserved for review at Record, pp. 208-210,
214-215,239-243.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995) which states as follows:
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than
one year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in
lands, shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful
agent thereunto authorized in writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants Colbys are the lessees of commercial premises from which they have
operated a retail closeout and liquidation business, the "Super Savers Store," for
approximately eight years. Respondent Nielsen is their lessor, who filed suit against
the Colbys in May 1996 seeking termination of the tenancy and restitution of the
premises on the basis of a letter/eviction notice providing approximately 30 days to
vacate, which was given under the misapprehension that the Colbys were month-tomonth tenants, having allegedly failed to promptly sign a written lease.
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The Colbys then retained new counsel, who promptly filed a Motion for Relief
from Judgment, or in the Alternative, for Stay Pending Appeal with additional affidavits
further clarifying the facts and a memorandum setting forth the controlling legal
authorities. This motion was denied by the district court after hearing on August 12,
1996. However, the court granted the Colbys' motion to stay the effect of its ruling,
leaving the Colbys in possession, and this appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Nielsen is the owner of commercial premises located at 761 West 12th Street,
Ogden, Utah. (Record, pp. 1, 37.) In March of 1989, the Colbys first began operating
their "Super Savers Store" from the premises owned by Nielsen, pursuant to an oral
lease. The initial rent was $400 per month, but the Colby's rent was subsequently
increased to $700 per month. (Record, p. 69.) In 1992, another building was added
and the rent was increased to $1,800 per month. Later, more space was again added
and the rent was increased to $2,400 per month. (Record, p. 69.)
In approximately October of 1995, the Colbys, concerned about the continuing
rise in their rents, requested a written lease from Nielsen. (Record, p. 69.) A written
lease was prepared by Nielsen stating a two-year term, and two originals, both signed
by Nielsen in black ink, were presented to the Colbys in early October 1995. (Record,
pp. 69-70, 132.) The lease provides, in part, as follows: "Term: This Lease
commences on 1 October 1995 and continues for a period of twenty-four months."
(Record, p. 122.)
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compartments and shelving, and they maintain about $200,000 worth of merchandise
on the premises, of which approximately 75 percent is perishable. (Record, p. 70.)
Nevertheless, by letter/eviction notice dated March 28, 1996, Nielsen informed the
Colbys of his intent to evict them from the commercial premises on approximately 30
days' notice. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.) The Colbys refused to voluntarily vacate the
premises and continued to send rental payments to Nielsen, which he accepted.
(Record, pp. 194-195.)
In May 1996, Nielsen filed a Complaint against the Colbys alleging that they
were month-to-month tenants as they had failed to sign the lease agreement in a timely
manner and return it to him, that he believed the Colbys may be insolvent, that the
written lease agreement was null and void as a contract offer which was withdrawn by
Nielsen prior to acceptance by the Colbys, and that the Colbys were in unlawful
detainer of the leased premises. The Complaint also sought an Order to Show Cause
as to why possession should not immediately be restored to Nielsen. (Record, pp. 1-6.)
An Order to Show Cause was issued, and a hearing was held on June 17, 1996.
The Colbys were represented by counsel at the hearing, but were not personally
present due to confusion as to the time of the hearing. (Record, pp. 20, 191-206.) At
the Order to Show Cause hearing, then counsel for Colbys stipulated in error that the
lease had not been signed by the Colbys, not realizing that the uncontested controlling
facts already before the court were Nielsen's signature, the Colbys' performance, and
Nielsen's acceptance. (Record, p. 203.) The district court held that the lease was an
6
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precluded a summary remedy. Alternatively, the Colbys argued that Nielsen's "offer"
had been accepted by the performance of the parties, so that Nielsen was bound by, or
at least estopped from, denying the validity of the lease. As a further argument, the
Colbys contended that the statement of an annual rent figure created a year-to-year
tenancy and that eviction was therefore improper on that basis as well. (Record,
pp. 46-67, 219-243.) The district court denied this motion but stayed the execution of
its order, and the Colbys appealed. (Record, pp. 142-143, 243.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The written lease signed by Nielsen as lessor should have been enforced
against him, as nothing more than his signature is required under Utah law. In
addition, the written lease was valid as between the Colbys and Nielsen, since each
acknowledged acceptance of its terms by performance over an extended period.
The equitable doctrine of estoppel also precluded Nielsen from denying that the
lease was effective as between himself and the Colbys, since his conduct led them to
rely on the protection of the lease and repudiation of his prior conduct, if allowed, would
result in great injury to the Colbys.
Finally, the tenancy created by the parties' conduct was at least a year-to-year
tenancy, as rent is stated as an annual amount. The existence of this and other
substantial factual disputes precluded the summary remedy of eviction.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE WRITTEN LEASE AGREEMENT WAS ENFORCEABLE
AS AGAINST NIELSEN, THE LESSOR, WHO HAD SIGNED IT.
The district court erred as a matter of law in refusing to enforce the lease against
Nielsen, who had drafted, initialed and signed it. Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (1995)
provides in part that:
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one
year, or for the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands,
shall be void unless the contract, or some note or
memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party
by whom the lease or sale is to be made. . . .
(Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, as applicable in this case, in order for a lease for a
period longer than one year to be enforceable against the lessor, it must be in writing
and signed by the lessor. It clearly was.
The case of Commercial Union Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) is instructive. Therein, Clayton Plastic Surgery argued that it was not
bound by a lease because it had not signed the lease. This Court rejected that
argument and specifically held that "The statute of frauds requires only that the
document be signed by the party granting the lease." Id. at 33 (emphasis supplied).
Utah law simply does not require that the tenant also sign the lease in order to render it

9

effective as against the landlord. There is no dispute as to the fact that at least one of
the original leases presented to the Colbys in October 1995 was signed by Nielsen.1
In the case of Edwards Pet Supply v. Bentley, 652 P.2d 889 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court upheld the validity of a lease where the lease had been signed by
the landlord and there was a dispute as to whether or not the tenant had signed the
lease. In addition, for 25 months the tenant had paid and the landlord had accepted,
rent at the amount as set forth in the lease. The Supreme Court noted that, "The
landlord's president admittedly signed the lease form, and the landlord admittedly
accepted over two years' rental payments in the amount prescribed therein." Id. at 890.
It is difficult to distinguish Edwards from the present facts.
Under controlling Utah precedent, the written lease signed by Nielsen is
unquestionably enforceable against him because he signed it. The trial court was
aware the lease had been signed by Nielsen and committed clear error in concluding
that the lease was not enforceable as against him. His order should be reversed.
II.
THE LEASE WAS ACCEPTED BY THE PARTIES'
PERFORMANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS TERMS.
In addition to signing the lease, Nielsen immediately began accepting the higher
rent payments it required. Contemporaneous with the new lease document, the rent

1

Of course, the Colbys maintain that there were two originals and that they
also signed one original of the lease at that time. However, the Colbys' signature is
irrelevant to this argument.
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jumped from $2,400 per month to $52,800 annually, paid at the rate of $4,400 per
month. This fact is pivotal for, as the Court of Appeals in Clayton, supra, stated, "It is
axiomatic that a party may become bound through its performance to a contract that it
has not signed." Id. at 34. Even without a signature, acceptance of a lease can be
demonstrated by performance, such as retaining possession, making of lease
payments, and accepting lease payments.
In the present case, both Nielsen and the Colbys performed in accordance with
the terms of the written lease. The Colbys made substantially increased rent payments
and Nielsen accepted those payments. This performance by the parties for a period of
approximately six months is compelling evidence that both Nielsen and the Colbys
considered the written lease to be binding as between them, had accepted its terms,
and relied upon its protections. This evidence was ignored by the district court.
Moreover, it is telling that even when Nielsen attempted to evict the Colbys, he thought
it necessary to acknowledge the existence of the written lease in his Complaint and
then allege that it was null and void. (Record, pp. 3-4.)
Accordingly, the district court also erred when it found that the Colbys had not
accepted the lease because they had not signed and notarized it. First, notarization
does not, of course, affect the validity of contracts, but merely establishes their
authenticity or to allow recordation. Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-1 (1994). See also,
Smalley v. Juneau Clinic BIdg. Corp., 493 P.2d 1296 (Alaska 1972) (failure of parties to
lease to comply with mandatory acknowledgment requirement of statute affected only
11

recordation and admissibility, and did not make the conveyance void as between the
parties). Therefore, it could not have been a condition precedent to the validity of the
lease. Second, even disregarding the statement in Carl Colby's affidavit that he had
signed the lease, the Colbys demonstrated their acceptance of its terms by payment of
the greatly increased rent over an extended period of time. As noted, Nielsen clearly
accepted those payments. Nielsen was therefore not free to withdraw his "offer" in
March 1996 because it had been previously accepted by performance.
III.
NIELSEN IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING THE
VALIDITY OF THE WRITTEN LEASE.
The equitable doctrine of estoppel requires:
(1)
An admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the claim afterwards asserted,
(2)
Action by the other party on the faith of such
admission, statement, or act, and
(3)
Injury to such other party resulting from
allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement, or act.
Consolidation Coal v. Division of State Lands, 886 P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994). See,
also, Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219, 1222 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (equitable estoppel is "conduct by one party which leads another party, in
reliance thereon, to adopt a course of action resulting in detriment or damage if the first
party is permitted to repudiate his conduct").
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In the case at bar, there is no factual dispute that Nielsen offered a written lease
to the Colbys and then accepted substantially increased rental payments from them
over a period of six months as if the written lease were in effect. In demonstrable
reliance on the protection of the lease, the Colbys maintained the premises, promoted
their business, continued to establish their good will at that location, and maintained
perishable and other inventory worth approximately $200,000. Then, Nielsen suddenly
and inconsistently claimed that the written lease was null and void (on grounds other
than nonpayment of rent) and attempted to evict the Colbys from their business
premises of seven years upon an impossible 30 days' notice.
If Nielsen is permitted to repudiate both his contract and his prior conduct, the
Colbys will be substantially injured. It is simply not practical for them to move the entire
inventory they maintain at the "Super Savers Store" in a few days, especially where
they have reasonably relied upon the protection of a two-year lease, and it is also not
fair to allow Nielsen to hold the threat of summary eviction over their heads.
Based on the undisputed course of dealing between the parties, including
Nielsen's conduct which led the Colbys to believe that they had a two-year lease, it was
error to order that Nielsen could summarily evict the Colbys. The district court erred in
this regard as a matter of law and its order should be reversed.
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IV.
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE
THE TENANCY CREATED BY THE PARTIES WAS,
AT A MINIMUM, A YEAR-TO-YEAR TENANCY.
The written lease executed by the parties was for a two-year term, October 1995
to October 1997. The lease specifically states as follows: "Term: This Lease
commences on 1 October 1995 and continues for a period of twenty-four months." The
lease additionally provides that the "annual base rent" is $52,800, which is payable in
monthly base rent installments of $4,400. The contemplation of the parties was
obviously the creation of a tenancy of a two-year duration.
Even assuming that the lease was not valid, since rent is stated annually, the
tenancy created was no less than year-to-year. At common law, the payment and
acceptance of rent thus calculated would have created no less than a year-to-year
tenancy. Evershed v. Berry, 436 P.2d 438 (Utah 1968). Such a holding makes
particular sense in a commercial context where substitute space is not readily available
and large amounts of perishable goods are involved.
The district court erred in concluding that the tenancy created by the Colbys'
payment of rent, and Nielsen's acceptance of that rent, was no more than a month-tomonth tenancy and thus allowed eviction on 30 days* notice. Although the Colbys paid
rent on a monthly schedule, in fact the rent due and owing was an annual rent, and
there is no evidence in the record to the contrary. Summary eviction was thus
improper.
14

V.
SUMMARY EVICTION WAS ALSO IMPROPER BECAUSE
OF THE EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL FACTUAL DISPUTES.
The Colbys respectfully submit that the district court's order should be reversed
as a matter of law on the grounds set forth in the preceding arguments. Even if
reversal were not available, however, factual disputes would still require vacation of the
order. Eviction is a severe remedy, particularly in a commercial setting where
perishable inventory is involved. Because of the material factual disputes regarding
two original leases, Carl Colby's signing and return of the lease to Nielsen, the parties'
intent regarding notarization, etc., the summary remedy of eviction was improper as a
matter of law.
In the case of D&L Enterprises, Inc. v. Davenport, 507 P.2d 373 (Utah 1973), the
Utah Supreme Court held that factual issues relating to a commercial lease dispute
precluded summary eviction. Therein, a five-year lease with an option to renew for ten
years was at issue. Thirty-five days before the end of the initial term, the plaintiff
served a notice to vacate on the defendant, alleging breach of the terms of the lease
other than failure to pay the rent. On appeal, the defendant argued that in light of
contested facts, the trial court's entry of summary judgment was error. The Supreme
Court agreed, finding that, "This record reflects contradiction in it that we consider
presents issues of fact. . . . We think this case must be tried before a court or a jury, on
its merits, and not by way of summary judgment." Id. at 374.
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Here, too, the factual record below contains significant disputes. Although these
material factual issues were initially not clearly laid out for the district court, they were
ignored after they were brought to its attention both in the Colbys' Motion for
Reconsideration and for Stay of Execution, and their subsequent Motion for Relief from
Judgment, or in the Alternative, to Stay Judgment Pending Appeal.
At that point, the existence of these substantial factual issues, which included
matters set forth in the findings of fact entered by the district court as a basis for its
Order and Judgment of Restitution, precluded the district court, as a matter of law, from
permitting its summary order of eviction to remain in force. Accordingly, the trial court,
in denying the Colbys' motion for relief, abused its discretion. Its order should
therefore be vacated on that ground.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellants Carl and Marie Colby, dba Super
Savers Store, respectfully request that this Court reverse the Order and Judgment of
Restitution entered by the lower court as a matter of law and award them their costs
incurred herein and attorney's fees in accordance with paragraph 18.08 of the lease.
Dated this 21 st day of January, 1997.
CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON

EDWIN C. BARNES
ANNELI R. SMITH
AMANDA D. SEEGER
Attorneys For Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Appellants' Brief to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this 21st day of
January, 1997:
Jeff R. Thome, Esq.
Mann, Hadfield & Thome
98 North Main
P.O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302
Attorneys for Respondent
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Jeff R Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #3250
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. 0. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone 723-3404
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DARRELL NIELSEN,

]

Plaintiff,

)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT
OF RESTITUTION

vs.
CARL COLBY and MARIE COLBY,
his wife, dba SUPER SAVERS
STORE,

)

Civil No. 960900192EV

)

Judge: Stanton M. Taylor

J\Jl ^

Defendants.

This matter came on for hearing before the above-entitled
Court on the 17th day of June, 1996 at the hour of 10:30 a.m.
The plaintiff was present in court and was represented by his
counsel of record, Jeff R Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield
and Thorne.

The defendant was not present, but was represented

by Richard Medsker of the firm of Farr, Kaufman, Sulllivan,
Gorman, Jensen, Medsker & Perkins.

The parties made "proffers"

to the court and stipulated that the evidence presented by the
proffers was accurate for purposes of the hearing.

The court

having heard the evidence, makes the following Findings of Fact.

vcnnv,* --L
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FINDINGS OF FACT:
1 .

The plaintiff, Darrell Nielsen, is a resident of

Bountiful, Davis County, State of Utah, and owns certain real
property with a street address of 761 West Twelfth Street, Ogden,
Utah 84404.
2.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court.

The defendants, Carl Colby and Marie Colby, his wife,

are doing business as Super Saver Stores, and have been occupying
as tenants the real property owned by Darrell Nielsen with a
street address of 761 West Twelfth Street, Ogden, Utah 84404.
3.

In the fall of 1995, plaintiff indicated that he would

have to have a Lease Agreement to continue the tenancy with the
defendants.

The plaintiff presented a Lease Agreement to be

signed by the defendants sometime the first part of October,
1996.
4.

The defendants did not sign the Lease Agreement until

after an "eviction notice" was served upon them.

A copy of the

Lease Agreement was received by the court as Plaintiff's Exhibit
No. 1.

A copy of the "eviction notice" was received as Plaintiff

Exhibit #

5.

2.

From October 1995 through March 28, 1996, the plaintiff

made several phone calls on a monthly basis to the defendants to
ask that the Lease Agreement be signed and returned.
defendant did not return many of the calls.
2

The

When conversation

were had with the defendant, Mr. Colby, he said he would have to
get his wife to sign the lease.
6.

The defendants issued two checks for rent payments

which failed to clear the bank because of insufficient funds in
defendants' bank account.

A check was returned to plaintiff

dated March 15, 1996, which the defendant gave a "cashier's
check" to pay the bounced check, and said, "I have to give
cashier's checks to everyone, now."
7.

The plaintiff, Darrell Nielsen, revoked or withdrew his

offer for the lease, and personally delivered to the defendants
an eviction notice, which was personally served upon Carl Colby
on March 28, 1996.
8.

Carl Colby initialed the eviction notice.

The eviction notice apprised Carl Colby that he was to

vacate the premises at the end of April, 1996.
9.

The defendants never signed the Lease Agreement prior

to the eviction notice.

The defendants admit that they signed

the Lease after they received the eviction notice, and Carl Colby
actually signed the Lease in the law firm of his attorney after
he brought in the eviction notice.

Mr. Colby dated his signature

as "10-6-95" even though it was not signed by him until April,
1996.

The lease contained "notary" clauses, to notarize the

parties signatures, which were not signed by notary publics.
10.

Since the eviction notice, Carl Colby issued a check
3

for rent dated April 15, 1996, which was returned to the
plaintiff because of insufficient funds in the defendants' bank
account.
11.

At the date of the hearing, the plaintiff had five (5)

payment checks from Carl Colby which he had not presented for
payment, because plaintiff did not want to incur the expense of
the bank charges for having the checks returned.

The plaintiff,

had checked with the bank upon which the defendants' checks were
drawn, and only one of the checks would clear the bank the
morning of the hearing.
12.

At the time the eviction notice was served upon the

defendants, the defendants were month-to-month tenants under
tenancy at will with the plaintiff.
13.

The eviction notice was served upon the defendants on

March 28, 1996, and gave them to the end of April to vacate the
premises.
14.

The defendants have failed to vacate the premises as

required by the eviction notice.
15.

The monthly rent which the defendants owe to the

plaintiff is the sum of $4,400.00 per month.
BASED UPON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS, IT IS HEREBY,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

No valid lease exists between plaintiff and defendants,
4

for the reason that the plaintiff had revoked or withdrawn his
offer to enter into the lease prior to the time the defendants
accepted the lease.
2.

At the time of service of the eviction notice, which

was received by the court as Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2, the
defendants were occupying the premises on a month-to-month lease,
and the notice gave defendants more than the time required under
the unlawful detainer statutes of the State of Utah to vacate the
premises.
3.

The defendants have failed to vacate the premises as

required by state law.
4.

The plaintiff is entitled to possession of the

premises, and the defendants are ordered to vacate the premises,
to remove their personal property, and to restore the premises to
the plaintiff, or be forcibly removed by the Sheriff or Constable
of Weber County.

The defendants are to vacate the premises

within three (3) business days following service of the Order,
unless the plaintiff agrees to any longer time.

If the plaintiff

agrees to any longer time, it shall be in writing so there is no
misunderstanding as to how long the defendants have to vacate the
premises.

A copy of this Order of Restitution shall be served

upon the defendants in accordance with Rule 4 of Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, by a person authorized to serve process pursuant
5

to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-58.

If personal service is impossible

or impractical, service may be made by mailing a copy of the
Order and form to the defendants' last known address and posting
a copy of the Order at a conspicuous place on the premises of 761
West Twelfth Street, Ogden, Utah 84404.

The date of service, the

name, title, signature and telephone number of the person serving
the order shall be legibly endorsed on a copy of the order served
upon the defendant, and the person serving the order shall file
proof of service in accordance with Rule 4(h) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
5.

If the defendant fails to comply with this order within

the time prescribed by this court, a sheriff of constable of
Weber County, at plaintiff's direction, may enter the premises by
force using the least destructive means possible to remove the
defendant.

Any personal property of the defendants may be

removed from the premises by the sheriff of constable and
transported to a suitable location for safe storage.

The sheriff

or constable, with the plaintiff's consent, may delegate
responsibility for storage to the plaintiff, who must store the
personal property in a suitable place and in a reasonable manner.
6.

The personal property removed and stored shall be

inventoried by the sheriff or constable who shall keep the
original inventory and personally deliver or mail the defendants
6

a copy of the inventory immediately after the personal property
is removed.

After demand by the defendant within 30 days of

removal of personal property from the premises, the sheriff or
constable shall promptly return all of the defendants' personal
property upon payment of the reasonable costs incurred for its
removal and storage.

If the storage costs are not paid, then

pursuant to the provisions of UTAH CODE ANN. §78-36-10.5, the
property may placed for a public sale.
7.

The court will reserve the issue of past due rents,

treble damages and attorney fees until a final hearing on this
matter.
DATED this

/

day of>

i77rAYEo
STANTON M./TAYLOR
DISTRICT CpURff/j
CDURA/JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE UPON OPPOSING COUNSEL
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial
Administration, counsel for the defendant hereby certifies that
on the /&
day of June, 1996, he served a copy of the
foregoing ORDER AND JUDGMENT OF RESTITUTION upon Richard Medsker,
Attorney for Defendants, Bamberger Square Building, 205 26th .^
Street, Suite 34, Ogden, Utah 84401, by mailing a copy this lb
day of June, 1996.
U<V

H

Jef fHre Thorne
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
7

Notice of objection to the proposed documents must be
submitted to the Court and counsel within five (5) days after
service.
pj/2:nielsen.ord
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Tab 2

Jeff R Thorne of Mann, Hadfield & Thorne, #32 50
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Zions Bank Building, 98 North Main
P. O. Box 876
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876
Telephone 723-3404
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

DARRELL NIELSEN,

]

Plaintiff,

;>

vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

J

CARL COLBY and MARIE COLBY,
his wife, dba SUPER SAVERS
STORE,
Defendants.

]I

Civil NO. 960900192EV

1I

Judge: Stanton Taylor

]

This matter came on before the court, the Honorable Stanton
Taylor, District Judge, presiding on the 29th day of July, 1996
at the hour of 10:00 a.m.

The plaintiff was represented by his

counsel of record, Jeff R Thorne of the firm of Mann, Hadfield
and Thorne.

The defendants were represented by their counsel of

record, Edward C
P.C.

Barnes of the firm of Clyde, Snow & Swenson,

The court heard the arguments of counsel for plaintiff and

counsel for defendants, and the court being fully advised issues
the following order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion
for Relief from Judgment is denied, the court ruling as a matter

of law that no valid lease existed between plaintiff and
defendants, and the court reaffirming its prior order in this
matter.

The court further finding that this constitutes a final

order on the eviction action, the court having specifically
reserved issues of damages and attorney's fees for a future
hearing.
DATED this

f day

of August, 1996.

STANTON TAYLOR
DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that on the £&day of August, 1996, I
mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion for Relief
From Judgment to Edwin C. Barnes, CLYDE, SNOW & SWENSON, P.C.,
201 South Main Street, Suite 1000, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

pj/2:dnielsen.ord
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